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Epoché

Concept · Philosophy

Suspension of judgment: the state of neither affirming nor denying anything about an uncertain matter, central to skepticism and transformed by phenomenology.

Epoché (from the Greek ἐποχή, "suspension") is the suspension of judgment: a mental state in which one neither affirms nor denies anything about a given matter. The term originates in Greek philosophy and was adopted above all by the skeptical tradition, although modern philosophy gave it a different meaning through phenomenology.

In Pyrrhonism, the skeptical school named after Pyrrho, epoché plays a central role. Starting from the view that non-evident matters cannot be known with certainty, the Pyrrhonists held that the wisest course was to refrain from both affirming and denying. Sextus Empiricus defined it as a state of the intellect by which we neither deny nor affirm anything. This intellectual rest was regarded as a path to ataraxia, a state of tranquillity and freedom from disturbance. To reach it, skeptics relied on argumentative tools such as the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus and the Five Modes of Agrippa, which displayed the variety of opinions and the lack of decisive criteria. Epoché did not amount to a dogmatic denial of all knowledge, since the very word skepsis means "inquiry" or "examination".

The strength of the concept varied among thinkers. Some practised a radical suspension on theoretical questions, while others came close to probabilism. In practical matters, epoché was associated with metriopatheia, a moderate attitude toward moral judgments. The Stoics used a related notion when they spoke of withholding assent from doubtful impressions.

Edmund Husserl revived the term in 1906 and transformed it considerably. For him, epoché is not only the suspension of theories about the world but the bracketing of the naive belief in the existence of reality itself, so that phenomena can be examined as they appear to consciousness. This operation prepares the phenomenological reduction. Husserl distinguished a universal epoché, which suspends all assumptions about existence, from a local epoché, which sets aside only certain presuppositions. This radicalism sets his epoché apart from both the classical version and Cartesian doubt.

The concept remains debated today. Scholars question whether suspending judgment can truly be achieved and whether the phenomenological version keeps the spirit of skeptical caution, and they note the difficulty of applying Husserl's method, whose formulations shifted throughout his work.

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